Miscellaneous general notes.
One important point (to follow up on today’s session) or way to frame things is to ask yourself: “Why do I find this philosophy convincing while others do not?” “Why am I convinced by this or that philosophical claim or position while others aren’t? Are they just being obtuse? Do they just not get it? Why do this happen?” Hegel would have us actually explain this fact. To cut to the chase, what determines whether or not one is receptive to a certain philosophy, according to Hegel, depends on one’s level of development. A useful way to frame this is to recall an old Scholastic metaphysical law: “effects are received according to the mode of the patient.” Thus, the same soundwaves will be received differently depending upon if the patient is a rock, a dog, a human, a human that speaks the language, etc. So, similarly, the same philosophical positions, arguments, etc. will be received by different people according to their “mode,” i.e. the SAME philosophy will produce a different effect. Of course, there is no way to step outside of one’s current viewpoint to compare the “effect” the philosophy has had on one with the philosophy “in itself” but that’s a problem of objectivity that we’ll tackle later. This, of course, can also sound chauvinistic, i.e. “you disagree with me because you’re not on my level.” But the alternative would seem to be that no one ever needs to change, perhaps radically change, themselves and their viewpoint in order become adequate to the philosophy they would understand, i.e. that is currently producing an effect in them. That is perhaps the deeper chauvinist of the individual egoism that insists there is nothing higher than their current viewpoint, so all things must conform to it. It is to render the very notion of development (a core part of Hegelianism) meaningless.
…from Prof. Peters on the Phenomenology of the Spirit:
It will likely read like gibberish. Yes, worse that Husserl. But, don’t worry, Hegel ain’t actually that hard. Seriously. Don’t be intimidated. There’s just a nest of terms that, as Lonergan and Hilbert would say, implicitly define one another that you have to a hold on and then the whole thing starts to open up.
One quick note: always learning new things in reading Hegel and the PhG (Phenomenologie des Geistes). (Gadamer has a whole thing about “classics” being those works which always reveal something new upon each subsequent reading.) New insight? Already discussed this last time but didn’t fully crystallize till after. Insofar as the M/S dialectic is internal to an individual consciousness – i.e. a process of self-testing in which one seeks to prove to oneself that one is not absolutely attached to one’s own merely natural existence – it represents a stage in the development of the very immanent criterion of consciousness that Hegel first elaborates in the Intro. In other words, just as the fear of death represents an early moment in the ongoing ability of spirit to intellectually abstract from immediacy, so too does the life-and-death struggle represent an early moment in spirit’s development of its own self-testing, i.e. its immanent criterion. Passing through life-and-death struggle and the fear of death are thus, for Hegel, necessary moments in the development of not just one’s “existential comportment” as Heidegger might say but of speculative thought. Of course, Hegel is probably off about this. But I think that’s part of what he’s saying. Interesting to think about, anyway. Are playground taunts and showdowns and daredevil acts or recklessness more generally necessary conditions for the emergence of reason?
We can do Zizek but he’s not up to Hegel’s level and ex falso sequitur quodlibet. Zizek accepts an extremely vulgar and unHegelian reading of the history of philosophy. For example, in the Wired Brain Intro he takes for granted that Kant represents some kind of radical break from the naive realism of the premodern era (as typified by Aristotle) when, for Hegel, Kant represents a reversion to radically naive viewpoint. For Hegel, in comparison to Kant, it is Aristotle who is the “idealist” insofar as, unlike Kant, Aristotle understands that being qua being is intelligible and that the criterion for knowledge is truth not sensuous immediacy and that therefore being and truth are convertible. Also in the Intro to Wired Brain Zizek accepts the extremely phenomenologically vulgar view (already overcome by Aristotle) that consciousness is perception and that, therefore, in order for consciousness to be conscious of itself it must perceive itself which then introduces the problem of an infinite regress of perceivers perceiving perception. This leads him to spin off into pseudo-profound reflections on the “rupture” intrinsic to consciousness, etc. Again, ex falso sequitur quodlibet. Zizek is for fun not speculative philosophy. But, to be fair, that’s more than can be said about just about everybody else these days.
From my understanding, Hegel doesn’t posit an “unsurpassable limit”, does he? I didn’t think of the Absolute as being limited.
Yes, good. And, of course, it will depend on what we mean by “limitation.” If we’re talking about the naive Kantian epistemological “limitation” by which we are doomed never to reach knowledge of the absolute, then this is no limitation, for Hegel – or rather, a pseudo-limitation that Spirit, initially behind its own back posits, merely so that it might transcend it. For quick reference, cf. the “Remark” in the “Restriction and the Ought” section of the Science of Logic. If by “limitation” we mean what London’s referring to, i.e. the disciplining of the “bad infinite” of mere natural inclination and the raising of desire to the universal or unrestricted “good infinite” or Spirit’s self-knowledge, then, yes, we can perhaps speak of Spirit’s self-limitation provided that we understand by that “self-determining.” However, beyond the need not to confuse strictly epistemological questions with moral and ethical questions (which Zizek invariably does), the radical phenomenological point is not to try to “picture-think” epistemological limitation, i.e. as some kind of quasi spatial distinction between the “in here” and the “out there”. It is this naivete that gives rise to the assumption that there is an unsurpassable or unbridgeable epistemological gulf between knowledge and being. These points are not even on Zizek’s radar.
Btw all the Zizek stuff on Godel and Cantor [in Hegel in a Wired Brain], sheer gibberish. Godelian incompleteness precisely reveals the infinite scope of human intelligence, i.e. that it cannot be restricted by any single logical system, spontaneously moves beyond them through questioning and insight. Real task is to overcome logicist ideal of science. This is what Kuh reveals, too. Hegel himself still too much of a logicist (hence, “Science of LOGIC”) despite partial insight into need to transcend it. Roger Penrose, of all people, seems to have gotten this, at least partially, when he noted that Godel’s theorem demonstrates that human intelligence is not an algorithm. Zizek lost.
In terms of standpoint theory, too complicated to respond to effectively here. Hegel is basically first to write from a moving viewpoint or standpoint (Standpunkt). Standpoints for Hegel = forms of consciousness each with respective “subject/knower”, “object/known,” and criterion of “objectivity/knowledge.” Goal is, then, among other things, to arrive at the standpoint of standpoints, i.e. to grasp precisely their relativity and the dialectical relations amongst them, aka Absolute standpoint. Lonergan much better here. Both more precise and more comprehensive. Philosophical differences, or viewpoints, more broadly, can be genetically, complementarily, or dialectically related. Viewpoint of 3 year genetically (i.e. developmentally) related to viewpoint of 13 year old, e.g. for one but not the other the amount of water is “objectively” conserved. Viewpoint of historian complementary to that of physicist. Generically, dialectic is constituted by linked but opposed principles of change. But, within dialectic must distinguish dialectic of contraries from dialectic of contradictories (Hegel fails, here). E.g. practical consciousness or viewpoint in dialectic of contraries with theoretical consciousness (Here, Lonergan and Zizek agree. Lonergan, as always, more precise, better. Zizek: “Don’t act. Just think.” Lonergan: “It is often necessary to withdraw from practicality in order to save practicality” since, of course, in the long-run, mere practicality (e.g. short-term thinking) is the most impractical of all. Cf. climate change.) In contrast, truth/falsity, good/evil constitute a dialectic of contradictories. Kierkegaard’s either/or. Or, even, CS Lewis: there is no plan to sublate heaven and hell.
So a more Hegelian / geneological standpoint epistemology is not a simple multicultural/pluralist “council of standpoints” but rather something like a succession of standpoints which congeal their predecessors within their own viewpoint. (?)
Yes, sounds right. Important difference between genetic vs. dialectical difference in viewpoint is that movement from false to true or evil to good viewpoint is not so much development as reversal of decline. Hegel (Marx, too) has no clear account of decline, so no clear differentiation between genetic vs. dialectical method.